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Abstract
We develop an endogenous growth model to study the long run consequences of oﬀshoring
with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model oﬀshoring as the
geographical fragmentation of a firm’s production chain between a home upstream division and a
foreign downstream one. On the positive side, we show that, when contracts are incomplete, the
possibility of oﬀshoring has favorable implications for economic growth. Yet, oﬀshoring induced
by a higher bargaining power of the upstream division can hamper growth: while there is always
a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and oﬀshoring activities, there is a
non-monotonic relationship between these and growth. Whether oﬀshoring with incomplete
contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. On the normative side, we
show that, whereas with complete contract eﬃciency is restored through a subsidy to R&D only,
with incomplete contracts a production subsidy to oﬀshored upstream divisions is needed too.
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1

Introduction

Oﬀshoring, along with debates and literature related to it, has enjoyed an exponential growth in
recent years. In particular, the controversy on the issue exploded in February 2004 when N. Gregory
Mankiw rationalized oﬀshoring through its long term positive consequences on the US economy.
He argued that oﬀshoring may release domestic resources that can be reallocated to the creation
of new products, new technologies and thus new and better jobs to replace those lost to cheaper
foreign countries.1 Trade economists have since rushed to support. Blinder (2006) calls oﬀshoring
the third industrial revolution, which can eventually be a sound occurrence for all workers, as the
first and the second were regardless of initial skepticism. Baldwin (2006) calls the process "a second
unbundling" that has occurred as a consequence of rapidly falling communication and coordination
costs. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) argue how traditional trade theory must give way for
a paradigm more relevant to today’s world, namely trade in "tasks". They show the benefits of this
phenomenon by pointing out its positive impact on real wages of all workers in the home country.2
Finally, Rodriguez-Clare (2009) uses a dynamic model to show that the negative terms of trade eﬀect
of oﬀshoring is outweighed by long-run gains as the origin country adjusts its research eﬀort.
Our aim is to contribute to this debate by highlighting possible gains and losses from oﬀshoring in
an endogenous growth scenario with heterogeneous firms where the economic benefits of research and
development (R&D) are not fully appropriable by innovators and some of the contracts supporting
production abroad are incomplete.
We develop our argument by modeling an economy consisting of two countries, North and South,
and two sectors, production and R&D. The North is the market for final products, which are horizontally diﬀerentiated. Varieties are supplied according to blueprints that are invented and patented by
1 Oﬀshoring

is frequently blamed by workers and trade unions for the slow pace of job growth in the United States

and for the swelling wage diﬀerential between low and high skill workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001).
2 In

their contribution, the positive eﬀect of oﬀshoring on wages is driven by a productivity eﬀect as oﬀshoring

translates into a form of technological progress. These results are qualified in Kohler (2004) and in Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007), where domestic workers only benefit if the labor cost savings of oﬀshoring are associated with
the labor intensive sector.
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R&D labs. In the wake of Grossman and Helpman (1991), endogenous growth is introduced through
a positive learning externality in R&D.
To enter the production market, entrepreneurs must first purchase a patent, and then engage in
process innovation with uncertain outcome to find their capacity in using the patent. In particular,
an entrepreneur’s capacity is determined by a random draw from some common productivity distribution as in Melitz (2003). Each entrepreneur organizes production along a vertical chain consisting
of two stages, intermediate supply ("upstream") and final assembly ("downstream"), performed by
two divisions within a vertically integrated firm. Vertical integration is due to the presence of tacit
knowledge that cannot be transmitted outside firm boundaries. Both R&D and final assembly are
assumed to take place in North only. Intermediates can be produced in North or South. This
is assumed to be a potential site for the production of intermediates using a standardized traditional technology that oﬀers productivity gains to entrepreneurs with bad draws, provided that they
are willing to bear the additional trade costs associated with international shipments.3 We call
"inshoring" an organizational structure in which both production stages take place in North and
"oﬀshoring" the alternative organizational structure in which intermediates are first produced in
South and then assembled in North.
The two countries diﬀer in terms of the quality of contract enforcement between divisions. Specifically, contracts are complete when both the upstream and the downstream divisions are located in
North. They are incomplete when the upstream division is located in South due to the lack of credible
institutions to perfectly enforce contracts.4 We model contractual incompleteness following recent
contributions that study firms’ ownership and location choices in environments in which economic
3 Using

Japanese firm level data from the period 1994-2000, Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2007) give empirical evidence

on how the scope for productivity improvements from oﬀshoring depends negatively on the initial level of productivity
of the firm. This in turn provides an eﬀective channel for less productive firms to catch up and restore competitiveness.
4 Nunn

(2007) for instance uses several proxies to measure contract incompleteness in the South: a weighed average

of a number of variables that measure individuals’ perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary
and the enforcement of contracts in 159 countries between 1997 and 1998 from Kaufmann et al. (2003); the measures
of judicial quality and contract enforcement from Gwartney and Lawson (2003) and World Bank (2004).
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interactions suﬀer from hold up problems.5 More precisely, we follow Grossman and Helpman (2002)
in adopting the transaction cost approach à la Williamson (1975, 1985), whose key idea is that the
quality of deliverables in a bilateral transaction is unobservable by third parties so that, after the
deliverables have been produced, the stakeholders involved in the transaction have to bargain on
some division of the surplus it would generate.6 However, by assuming that upstream-downstream
transactions take place within the boundaries of firms, we abstract from the ownership decision and
focus, instead, on the location decision. In other words, what generates contractual incompleteness
is not the crossing of firms’ boundaries but rather the crossing of countries’ borders.
This setup generates new positive and normative insights on the dynamic and static aggregate
eﬀects of oﬀshoring. On the positive side, we show that, when contracts are incomplete, the possibility of oﬀshoring has favorable implications for economic growth. That does not happen when
contracts are complete, in which case oﬀshoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The key
parameter regulating the growth eﬀect of oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts is the bargaining
power of upstream divisions. In particular, we show that, while a marginal increase in the bargaining power of upstream divisions always encourages more firms to oﬀshore, it fosters growth only if
such bargaining power is initially small enough. Otherwise, oﬀshoring activities encouraged by a
stronger upstream bargaining power slows down growth. Lastly, we show that whether oﬀshoring
with incomplete contracts also favors steady state consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. For
example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed, consumption increases when there are a
lot of unproductive firms and very few productive ones.
On the normative side, we highlight that, just like in Grossman and Helpman (1991), with oﬀshoring under complete contracts the endogenous growth rate of the economy is suboptimally low
due the positive learning externality in R&D. In this case, eﬃciency is restored through a subsidy to
R&D only. This is, instead, not enough under incomplete contracts as the hold up problem causes
underproduction. Accordingly, with incomplete contracts, the R&D subsidy has to be complemented
5 See
6 See,

Helpman (2006) for a survey.
e.g., Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004) for the alternative property-rights approach to model

incomplete contracts and hold up problems à la Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) .
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by a production subsidy to oﬀshored upstream divisions.7

To the best of our knowldge, our analysis represents the first attempt to study the long run
consequences of oﬀshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. A large branch of the
international trade literature on firm organization has been devoted to the incomplete nature of
contracts in arrangements between firms. On the dynamic side of this front, Naghavi and Ottaviano
(2006, 2008, 2009) use a growth model à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) to study the potential tension that may arise between the static and dynamic implications of the fragmentation of production.
They find that while outsourcing gives rise to complementary upstream and downstream innovation,
incomplete contracts may prevent static gains of specialized production from carrying through in
the long run. They also find that oﬀshoring can slow growth by reducing the feedback from oﬀshored plants to labs. Yet, in their model there is no firm heterogeneity so that, in equilibrium,
firms either all outsource or they all vertically integrate.8 Grossman and Helpman (2004), Antràs
and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) are among the first papers to study
the organization of firms in the presence of heterogeneity in a static set up. Our contribution adds
to this literature by studying the industry dynamics of firm organization, in particular the interactions between oﬀshoring and growth.9 Our model also diﬀers from previous work the organizational
choices of heterogeneous firms as we do not apply the typical extra fixed cost that generally leads
more productive firms to undertake a more costly form of organization. This helps us avert potential
misleading assumptions as it is not clear how fixed costs can be ranked across organizational forms.10

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 charac7 This

stresses a novel reason to support FDI that supplements those already highlighted in the literature. See,

e.g., Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Ch.10).
8 The

same is true in the Ricardian growth model by Ottaviano (2009).

9 The

only other growth models with heterogeneous firms to our knowledge are Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008)

and Segerstrom and Gustaﬀson (2009), which explore the impact of trade liberalization on growth in the presence of
heterogeneous firms. These papers, however, do not investigate the impact of contractual incompleteness.
10 For

instance, Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume that fixed costs of vertical integration are larger while Grossman,

Helpman and Szeidl (2005) suppose that outsourcing fixed costs are more substantial.
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terizes the market equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the interactions between oﬀshoring, innovation
and economic growth. Section 5 highlights the role of contractual incompleteness in determining the
long run eﬀects of oﬀshoring. Section 6 concludes.

2

A Dynamic Model of Oﬀshoring

The economy consists of two countries, North and South. We assume that all workers and consumers
belong to the North but can be employed in South as expatriates to work in the oﬀshored plants.
Hence the South is simply a potential production site. This emphasizes the tacitness of knowledge
by ruling out perfect substitutability of Southern labor for Northern labor, with the intention of
abstracting from typical labor market debates on wages that have been widely studied empirically
and are being widely studied theoretically parallel to the writing of this paper.11 This helps single out
the additional impacts of oﬀshoring on growth in the home country that have often been neglected in
the literature. In addition, observed empirical evidence does not always approve of the phenomenon
of one job shifted abroad being immediately one job released at home.12

2.1

Overview and timing of events

Before getting into the details of the model, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the way it works.
Consumers have CES preferences over a horizontally diﬀerentiated good . The production of each
variety of good  requires a blueprint, an intermediate input and assembly. Blueprints are created
by independent R&D labs that sell their blueprints to entrepreneurs. All labs operate in North.
An entrepreneur discovers her ability to turn the acquired blueprint in a sellable product only after
buying. Her ability is determined by a random productivity draw. Upon observing its productivity ,
the entrepreneur organizes her firm as a vertical value chain with an "upstream" division producing
the intermediate input and a "downstream" division turning it into the final product. While final
production takes place in North, the firm can either "inshore" intermediate production in North,
11 For

recent theoretical analyses of oﬀshoring as means of trade and its eﬀects on real wages see Baldwin and

Robert-Nicoud (2007), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2009).
12 See

for instance Debande (2006) for the US and Japanese cases.
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using its own technology, or "oﬀshore" it to South using a cost-reducing standardized technology. In
this way, oﬀshoring oﬀers a viable alternative to the least eﬃcient firms only. This alternative comes
with strings attached. On the one hand, shipping intermediates from South to North incurs trade
costs. On the other hand, oﬀshoring takes place under contractual incompleteness, which generates
further costs due to ex post bargaining.
To summarize, in each period  the following sequence of events take place. First, independent
labs engage in R&D to create new patented blueprints. Second, entrepreneurs enter by purchasing
a blueprint, realize their productivity levels in terms of non-standardized production and choose the
location of upstream divisions. Third, upstream divisions manufacture the inputs needed by their
downstream counterparts. Fourth, once intermediate production is completed, the upstream and
downstream divisions of producers that have oﬀshored bargain over the share of total revenues from
final sales and inputs are handed over by the former to the latter. Lastly, final assembly takes place
and final products are sold to households.

2.2

Demand side

There are  infinitely-lived households with identical preferences defined over the consumption of
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good . The utility function is assumed to be instantaneously CobbDouglas and intertemporally CES with unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution:
=

Z

∞

− ln ()

(1)

0

where   0 is the rate of time preference and
() =

"Z

()

( )
0

−1



# −1



is a CES quantity index in which ( ) is the consumption of variety , () is the number of available
varieties of good , and  is the own and cross demand elasticity of any variety, and thus an inverse
measure of the degree of product diﬀerentiation between varieties. Households have perfect foresight
and they can borrow and lend freely in a perfect capital market at instantaneous interest rate ().
Using multi-stage budgeting to solve their utility maximization problem, households first allocate
7
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their income flow between savings and expenditures. This yields a time path of total expenditures
() that obeys the Euler equation of a standard Ramsey problem:
·

()
= () − 
()

(2)

where we have used the fact that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals unity. By
definition, () =  ()() where  () is the exact price index associated with the quantity index
():
 () ≡

"Z

()

( )

1−

#1(1−)



0



(3)

Households then allocate their expenditures across all varieties, which yields the instantaneous
demand function
( ) = ()( )−  ∈ [0 ()]

(4)

for each variety. In (4) ( ) is the price of variety  and

() =

()
 ()1−

(5)

is aggregate demand. Throughout the rest of the paper, we leave the time dependence of variables
implicit when this does not generate confusion.

2.3

Supply side

There are two factors of production in the economy. Labor is inelastically supplied by households
and each household supplies one unit of labor so that we can use  to refer both to the number
of households and the total endowment of labor. Labor is freely mobile between countries and
it is chosen as numeraire. The other factor is knowledge capital in the form of blueprints for
the production of diﬀerentiated varieties. Blueprints are protected by infinitely lived patents and
depreciate at a constant rate .
There are two sectors, innovation (R&D) and production. Perfectly competitive labs invent blueprints for the production of the diﬀerentiated varieties. The production of each variety requires a
single blueprint and consists of an upstream and a downstream stage. Entrepreneurs enter by buying
8
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the rights to use the blueprints and split their activities between an upstream division supplying
intermediates and a downstream division assembling them. Assembly takes place only in North
whereas intermediate inputs can be produced also in South using an older standardized traditional
technology ("oﬀshoring"). Southern production takes place through a standardized traditional technology, which allows one unit of labor to produce   0 units of intermediates.
Shipping the intermediate inputs back to the North for assembly incurs iceberg trade costs:
  1 units must be shipped for one unit to reach destination. Trade costs can be embedded into
the productivity parameter of the South without loss of generality. Hence, throughout the rest of
the paper, we will use  =   to denote the standard southern technology inclusive of trade
costs. Northern production can rely on new advanced technologies that are generated by process
innovation. This is a risky endeavor as long as its outcome is uncertain and the property rights on
patents have to be bought in advance before experimenting new production processes. Specifically,
after buying the rights to use the blueprints from labs, producers randomly draw their productivity
level  from a continuous cumulative distribution () with support [0 ∞) so that oﬀshoring oﬀers
productivity gains to producers with bad draws    . Final assembly in turn needs one unit of
the intermediate component for each unit of the final good no matter where intermediates originate
from. Intermediates are variety-specific: once produced for a certain assembly line, they have no
alternative use.
Oﬀshoring is associated with contractual costs that arise from weak legal institutions in the
South. Specifically, only high quality variety-specific intermediates can be processed whereas low
quality ones are useless even though supplied at zero cost. Contracts between the upstream and
the downstream divisions are complete when both are located in North, but incomplete when the
upstream division is oﬀshored to South. In this case the quality of intermediates can not be assessed
by third parties. That generates a hold up problem: after the upstream division has supplied its
specific input, it has to reach an agreement with the downstream division on how to share the joint
surplus (revenues) from final sales. The agreement is reached through Nash bargaining and we
denote the bargaining weight of the upstream division by .

9
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Finally, we introduce endogenous growth by assuming that R&D faces a learning curve so that the
marginal R&D cost of blueprints decreases with the number of blueprints that have been successfully
introduced in the past. Specifically, the invention of a new blueprint requires  units of labor where
  0 is a parameter and  is the total number of blueprints that have already been patented.13
Given the chosen functional form, some initial stock of implemented blueprints 0  0 is needed to
have finite costs of innovation at all times. We assume that this stock belongs to North.

3

Market Equilibrium

3.1

Production

At time  the instantaneous equilibrium is found by solving the model backwards from final production to R&D. Varieties can be sold to final customers by two types of producers: "inshorers" have
both divisions in North whereas "oﬀshorers" have their upstream divisions in South and their downstream ones in North. Under inshoring, as contracts are complete, the upstream and downstream
divisions of the same firm first maximize the firm’s profit and then share it according to their bargaining weights. This implies that the upstream division of a producer with labor productivity  selects
intermediate output () to maximize operating profit   () =  () =  () () where
 (),  () and  () are final revenues, final price and final output (itself equal to intermediate
production). Given the demand curve (4), profit maximization yields markup pricing
 () =

 1
−1

with associated output  () =  () =  ()− and operating profit   () =  () =
 ()1− . A share  of   () goes to the upstream division and the rest to the downstream
one.
13 The

assumed shape of the learning curve serves analytical solvability and the comparison with Grossman and

Helpman (1991). In equilibrium it yields a ‘size eﬀect’, meaning that larger countries grow faster. To avoid this this
prediction that runs against the empirical evidence, one could assume that the intensity of the learning spillover is
lower, i.e.  with 0    1 (Jones, 1995). This would turn our setup into a quasi-endogenous growth model in
the wake of Segerstrom (1998).

10
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Under oﬀshoring, the producer uses the standardized technology with upstream labor productivity  and gets the joint surplus of its divisions under incomplete contracts. This surplus is given
by the revenues from final sales and is divided between divisions through ex post Nash bargaining.
Absent any outside option, revenues are therefore split according to the bargaining weights of the
two parties with a share (1 − ) going to the downstream division and the remaining share  going
to the upstream one. The upstream division decides how much input  to produce anticipating
that bargaining outcome. Hence, it maximizes   =   −   where  and  are final price
and final output (itself equal to intermediate production). Given the demand curve (4), this yields
markup pricing for final sales
 =

1

 − 1 

with associated output  =  = −
and revenues  =   = 1−
.14



A share  =

(1 − ) goes to the downstream division while the complementary share goes to the upstream
one. Accordingly, after subtracting labor costs, the upstream division is left with   =  :
larger upstream bargaining weight and stronger product diﬀerentiation shift a larger share of a
given joint surplus  from downstream to upstream divisions. Hence, the overall operating profit
of the oﬀshorer is   =  +   = [1 + ( − 1)(1 − )]  .15 Since the downstream division does
not contribute anything before the bargaining stage, the joint surplus  (and the joint profit   as
well) is at its maximum when  goes to one. In other words, when  goes to one, the incomplete
contract outcome converges to the complete contract one.
As producers can freely choose between inshoring and oﬀshoring, the operating profits they earn
are equal to () ≡ max[ ()  ] The fact that   () is an increasing function of productivity 
implies that there exists a unique threshold productivity level ("cutoﬀ") ∗ above which producers
14 The
15 For

upstream division does not face an incentive constraint as the optimal output is always positive.
the upstream division the adverse incentive due to ex post bargaining under incomplete contracts has exactly

the same impact as an iceberg trade cost that melts a fraction (1 − ) of intermediate output shipped from South to
North, and therefore does not generate revenues for that division. The fact that here the fraction (1 − ) of revenues
is recovered by the downstream division explains why the overall operating profit of the oﬀshorer is larger than that
of the simple iceberg case.

11
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prefer to inshore. This cutoﬀ solves   (∗ ) =   and is therefore equal to
1

∗ = ( ) [1 + (1 − )( − 1)] −1

(6)

The cutoﬀ is decreasing in  because weaker product diﬀerentiation shifts surplus from upstream
to downstream divisions exacerbating intermediate underproduction and thus promoting inshoring.
For symmetric reasons, the cutoﬀ is increasing in the upstream bargaining weight . It is also
increasing in  as oﬀshoring is fostered by any improvement in the productivity of the standardized
technology  or any fall in trade cost  .
We can therefore highlight:
Proposition 1 A marginal increase in the bargaining weight of upstream divisions encourages more
firms to oﬀshore.
Since 1( ) is the amount of labor embedded in unit revenues, it will turn out to be useful
to denote by 
e  ≡  the "delivered" productivity of oﬀshored labor. We will call this simply

"oﬀshored productivity" and we will contrast it with producer-specific "inshored productivity" .

Note that (6) shows that a marginal producer drawing exactly ∗ has higher inshored than oﬀshored
productivity (∗  
e  ) so that the range (e
  ∗ ) identifies producers whose decisions to oﬀshore
reduce aggregate productivity. Moreover, due to ∗   0, the cutoﬀ ∗ achieves its maximum

value  at  equal to 1, so any other value of  implies ∗   . Hence, incomplete contracts
generate two adverse eﬀects of oﬀshoring on aggregate productivity. First, firms drawing values of
 between 
e  and ∗ oﬀshore while they have higher inshored productivity. Second, firms drawing
values between ∗ and  do not oﬀshore whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing

so would increase their productivity. In Figure 1 we call these adverse eﬀects penalization 1 and
penalization 2 respectively. Indeed, when  is equal to 1, (6) implies ∗ = 
e  =  so that all firms

with a productivity level    oﬀshore and their decision to do so improves aggregate productivity.

To summarize, producers’ organizational choices give the following cutoﬀ results for prices and

12
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overall profits:

() =

3.2

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩

 1
−1 


and () =

 1
−1 

Innovation

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨

1+(−1)(1−)
()1−


⎪
⎪
⎩

1
1−
 ()

for  ∈

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ [0 ∗ )

⎪
⎪
⎩ [∗  ∞)

(7)

At the innovation stage, labs invent new blueprints at a marginal cost that depends on acquired
experience  and their output determines the law of motion of . In particular, we have
·

=


− 


(8)

·

where  ≡ ,  is labor employed in inventing new blueprints,  is its productivity and  is
the rate of depreciation.
Due to learning, as innovation cumulates, it becomes increasingly cheaper to introduce new
blueprints and, being priced at marginal cost, their value falls through time. Specifically, if we
call  the asset value of a patented blueprint, marginal cost pricing gives  = , which implies
·

·

 = −.
Labs pay their researchers by borrowing at the interest rate  and know that the resulting patents
will generate instantaneous dividends equal to the expected profits of the corresponding producers .
·

Arbitrage in the capital market then requires the dividends  and capital gains  to match interest
payments  and depreciation  so that:

+ =

 ̇
−



(9)

where the equality is granted by the definition of .

3.3

Aggregation

In characterizing the aggregate behavior of our heterogeneous economy, we follow Melitz (2003) and
define average (output-weighted) productivity as:
n
o 1
−1 −1
∗

e ≡ (∗ )e
−1
+
[1
−
(
)]

e



(10)
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T h e F ig u r e 1 : T h e P r o d u c tiv ity D is tr ib u tio n a n d a n I n c r e a s e in 

G   
o ffsh o re

1 - G   
in s h o re

in te n s iv e

0

e x te n s iv e


     
o ffs h o rin g
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v

   

o ffs h o rin g
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but do not
o ffs h o re

p e n a liz a tio n 1

p e n a liz a tio n 2

Figure 1: Industry partition
where, as already mentioned, 
e  ≡  is the common productivity of oﬀshorers and
∙

1

e =
1 − (∗ )

Z

∞

∗

−1



1
¸ −1
()

is the average (output weighted) productivity of inshorers. Since ∗  
e  , we have 
e   ∗  
e,


e  
e
e  and e
 ∗  0. Figure 1 shows a ranking of the productivity levels.16

We also define  as the share of expenditures going to oﬀshorers, and  and  as the cor-

responding exact price and quantity indices such that   =  . Analogously, we define  as
the share of expenditures going to inshorers, and  and  as the corresponding exact price and
quantity indices such that   =  and  +  = . Then we have:
1
 1

e =
,  = { [1 − (∗ )]} 1− e ,  =
,  =
−1
e


where e is the average price of inshorers. Analogously, we can write
 =

and

16 While

e =

1
 1

,  = {(∗ )} 1−  ,  =
,  =
−1
e


µ

µ







¶1−

¶1−



(11)



1
ª 1−
©
 1

,=
,  = (∗ )1− +  [1 − (∗ )] e1−

−1
e



 is larger than ∗ in Figure 1, this is not always necessarily the case.
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3.4

Financial market clearing

Since producers discover their productivity only after acquiring the right to use a patented blueprint,
the dividends they are willing to pay to labs equal their expected operating profits
 = (∗ )  + [1 − (∗ )]e


(12)

where, since  =   [(∗ )], the operating profit of a typical oﬀshorer   can be rewritten in
terms of aggregate variables as
 =

[1 + ( − 1)(1 − )] 
(∗ )

and, by definition, the average operating profit of inshorers equals

e =


[1 − (∗ )]

By (11), expected operating profits (12) simplify to
=

∙
¸
 1
−1
+
Ω
 


(13)

where Ω ≡ (1 − )   is the share of aggregate expenditures accruing to the downstream divisions
of oﬀshorers. Expression (13) shows that expected profits are an increasing function of Ω. When
a higher share of expenditures in the economy goes to oﬀshorers, expected profits are larger in the
industry. To see this, note that keeping fixed total expenditure  and the proportion of oﬀshoring
firms (∗ ), shifting a unit of expenditures from inshorers  to oﬀshorers  increases average
profits because the downstream oﬀshored divisions earn a share 1 −  of revenues  while the
inshored ones only earn a share 1 −  of profits   =  .17 This also explains why the positive
impact of Ω on  is larger when  is larger. Larger downstream bargaining power (1 − ) also
increases expected profits at the time of entry.
Once substituted into (9), expression (13) allows us to restate the Euler condition (2) as:
·


̇

=
[1 + ( − 1) Ω] − −  − 



17 Inshores

(14)

have a higher sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution as with oﬀshoring all variable costs of producing

intermediates are passed over to upstream suppliers. See Grossman and Helpman (2002, p. 102) for more detail.
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3.5

Labor market clearing

Aggregate labor endowment  is absorbed by innovation ( ) as well as by inshored and oﬀshored
upstream production. Inshorers’ and oﬀshorers’ employment levels amount to  =  (e
 
e  ) and

 =  (  ) respectively. Accordingly, given (11), total employment in upstream production

simplifies to
 +  =

−1
(1 − Ω)


which, together with (8), allows us to rewrite the labor market clearing condition  =  +  + 
as
µ
¶
−1

=
+ +
(1 − Ω)



(15)

Employment in production is a decreasing function of the share Ω of aggregate expenditures accruing
to the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers. This is the dual of the previously discussed result that
expected profits increase with Ω as long as larger expected profits induce a reallocation of labor from
production to R&D.

4

Oﬀshoring and Growth

The market clearing conditions (14) and (15) define a dynamic system in two unknowns: the growth


rate of the stock of patents () and the expenditures level (). A unique balanced growth path
exists along which these variables are constant and is achieved without any transition dynamics.18
Calling the corresponding growth rate and expenditures level by  and  respectively, then im·

·

posing  =  ,  =  and  = 0 in (14) and (15) allows us to find:
 =




µ

¶
1
−1
−1
+
Ω −
(1 − Ω)  − ,  =  + 




(16)

While expenditures  do not depend on Ω, the growth rate  is instead an increasing function of
Ω. The reason is that, by definition, a rise in Ω shifts expenditures from inshorers to oﬀshorers. This
shift, as discussed above, generates larger expected profits and smaller employment in production.
The resulting reallocation of labor from production to R&D promotes innovation and growth.
18 See

Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.3) for details.
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Since  does not depend on Ω, the bargaining weight  does not aﬀect expenditures. It aﬀects,
however, the growth rate through various channels funneled through the impact of Ω on  . To
disentangle these channels, we use (10) and (11) to rewrite the share Ω of expenditures accruing to
the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers as
Ω = (1 − )


= (1 − )


µ




¶1−

= (1 − ) (∗ )

µ


e

e

¶−1

where 
e  ≡  is oﬀshored productivity and 
e is the average (oﬀshored and inshored) productivity

as defined in (10). Since  Ω  0, the sign of the impact of  on  depends on the sign of
Ω. This can be decomposed as:

Ω
= − + (1 − )



(17)

where  ≡  .
Consider a marginal increase in . The first term on the right hand side is the direct eﬀect of
larger . It is negative as it identifies the corresponding fall in the share of expenditures accruing to
the downstream divisions of oﬀshorers holding the overall share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers
constant. It captures a pure surplus reallocation between divisions as a higher upstream bargaining
weight transfers surplus from downstream to oﬀshored upstream divisions.
The second term on the right hand side of (17) is the indirect eﬀect. It identifies the change
in the overall share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers. This adjustment takes place along two
margins: the relative number of oﬀshorers as determined by (∗ ) ("extensive margin") and their
relative size with respect to the average producer  e
 = (e
 e
)−1 ("intensive margin"):
 ( e
)
(∗ )

) + (∗ )
=
( e




where e = ̃1− . The impact of larger  is positive on both margins. Since a larger bargaining

weight of upstream divisions alleviates their underproduction of intermediates, as  rises not only
more producers decide to oﬀshore, but also oﬀshorers become larger. Along the extensive margin,
by (6) we have ∗   0 and thus (∗ )  0. Along the intensive margin, using 
e  ≡ 
17
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and (10), we have

=
e

µ


e

e

¶−1

=


e −1
( )−1
=
R∞
−1
(∗ )e
−1
+ [1 − (∗ )] 
e −1
(∗ ) ( )
+ ∗ −1 ()



(18)

which, given ∗   0 and (∗ )∗  0, is an increasing function of  (see Appendix 1 for a
proof that  ( e
)   0). Hence, we can conclude that    0, which, given (17), implies
that improved contract enforcement in the South has ambiguous eﬀects on Ω and, therefore, on  .
To shed light on such ambiguity, we can manipulate (17) to show that a higher bargaining weight
of upstream divisions promotes growth when the elasticity of the oﬀshorers’ market share  to  is
larger than the ratio between their upstream and downstream divisions’ bargaining weights, i.e.

 ln 

 ln 
1−

(19)

If the reverse is true, a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions hampers growth. Figure 1
shows the eﬀect of an increase in  on the productivity distribution of firms graphically. Larger 
directly raises 
e  , while it reduces [1 − (∗ )] 
e  through a change in ∗ . This makes the change in

average productivity 
e ambiguous in , yet inferior to the rise in 
e  . Also, the productivity range

along which oﬀshoring raises aggregate productivity increases if the change in the intensive margin

is larger than that in the extensive margin (e
   ∗ ) so that the two values converge, and
falls if the opposite holds so that they diverge. Finally, note that the values achieved by  ln   ln 
at  = 0 and at  = 1 are both strictly positive and finite provided that the elasticity of the extensive
margin  ln (∗ ) ln ∗ is also positive and finite, as in the case of all the commonly used families
of cumulative density functions (see Appendix 2 for a proof). Then, since (1 − ) equals zero at
 = 0 and goes to infinity when  goes to one, there must exist a threshold value of  below which
the inequality (19) holds and above which it is violated. Hence, there exists a unique threshold value
for the bargaining weight of upstream divisions  such that Ω  ()0 and, thus,    ()0
if and only if  falls below (above) that value.
Hence, we can state:
Proposition 2 A marginal increase in the bargaining weight of upstream divisions fosters growth if
it is initially small and hampers growth if it is initially large enough.
18
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To sum up, Proposition 1 tells us that a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions unambiguosly promotes oﬀshoring. Proposition 2 tells us that this rise of oﬀshoring stimulates growth as
long as that bargaining weight is not too large. The reason is that a higher bargaining weight  increases the share of expenditures accruing to oﬀshorers through two positive indirect eﬀects on their
relative size ("intensive margin") and number ("extensive margin"). On the other hand, a higher 
has a negative direct eﬀect on the fraction of oﬀshorers’ revenues appropriated by their downstream
divisions. While the indirect eﬀects boost oﬀshorers profitability and thus growth by reallocating
labor from production to R&D, the direct eﬀect works in the opposite direction. This eﬀect comes
to dominate when  is large enough, generating a non-linear relation between the bargaining weight
of upstream divisions and the growth rate.

5

Contracts and Welfare

The aim of this section is twofold. On the one hand, we want to clarify how our results depend
on the quality of contract enforcement. In so doing, we first characterize the steady state outcome
when oﬀshoring takes place under complete contracts. We then use this characterization to unveil the diﬀerent performance of the economy when the transition from no oﬀshoring to oﬀshoring
happens under incomplete rather than complete contracts. This will also highlight the role of firm
heterogeneity. On the other hand, we want to highlight how incomplete contracts lead to diﬀerent
policy implications with respect to complete contracts.

5.1

Complete contracts

To better understand the role of contractual incompleteness for our results, it is useful to characterize
the steady state outcome of the model in two scenarios: one in which oﬀshoring is inhibited (so that
the hold up problem is not an issue) and the other in which oﬀshoring takes place under complete
contracts.
In both cases at the aggregate level the model with heterogeneous firms is homomorphic to a
model with homogeneous firms à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) in which all firms are identical to
19
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the average heterogeneous firm. Accordingly, average productivity (and ultimately the productivity
cutoﬀ) provides a suﬃcient statistic to describe the aggregate behavior of the economy. When
oﬀshoring is inhibited, average productivity is

e ≡

∙Z

∞

−1



()

0

1
¸ −1

due to the fact that, by definition, no entrepreneurs relies on the foreign standardized technology.
On the other hand, when oﬀshoring is allowed for and contracts are complete, average productivity
is equal to
n
o 1
−1 −1
∗

e  ≡ (∗ )−1
+
[1
−
(
)]

e




(20)

e  as the productivity cutoﬀ under contractual completewhere from (6) we have ∗ =   ∗  
ness, and 
e  is the corresponding average productivity of inshorers

e 

"

1
≡
1 − (∗ )

Z

∞

1
# −1

−1 ()

∗


In both case, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), eﬃciency in production is immaterial for
steady state growth and expenditures because it conveys equal incentives to production and innovation. As a result, steady state growth and expenditures are the same in the two complete contract
scenarios:

 =  =

1  −1
−
 −  and  =  =  =  + 



(21)

In addition, steady state expenditures are also the same as those with incomplete contracts.
Average productivity aﬀects, instead, the aggregate quantities consumed in the various scenarios
as these quantities are given by expenditures divided by the corresponding average prices
 =

−1
−1
−1

e  ( + ) ,  =

e  ( + ) ,  =

e  ( + )




(22)

where, for notational symmetry, we use 
e  to relabel the average productivity (10) that prevails
with incomplete oﬀshoring contracts.

Comparing the two complete contract scenarios, we see that the fact that less eﬃcient firms
oﬀshore for    implies 
e  
e  and thus    . Hence,
20
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Proposition 3 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual completeness generates a static welfare
gain due to more production but no dynamic welfare eﬀect through a change in the growth rate.
The reason for this is that oﬀshoring operates as "neutral" technological progress that evenly
augments both the profitability of R&D and the profitability of production. As a result, when firms
oﬀshore there is no reallocation of labor between R&D and production. All that happens is that
more eﬃcient labor generates more output.

5.2

Incomplete contracts

We can now compare the steady state outcomes with or without incomplete contracts. As for growth
rates, expressions (16) and (21) show that oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts leads to faster growth
with respect to both no oﬀshoring and oﬀshoring under complete contracts, the more so the larger
is Ω. In particular, we have
 −  =

−1
Ω


µ

¶

+ 0


Hence:
Proposition 4 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual incompleteness generates dynamic welfare gains due to faster growth.
The reason for this is that oﬀshoring operates as "biased" technological progress that augments
the profitability of R&D more than the profitability of production. As a result, when firms oﬀshore
there is a reallocation of labor from production to R&D.
Turning to consumption, we have shown in Section 3.1 that incomplete contracts generate two
adverse eﬀects of oﬀshoring on aggregate productivity. First, firms drawing values of  between 
e

and ∗ oﬀshore while they have higher inshored productivity. This does not happen under complete

contracts for which we have 
e  = ∗ . Second, firms drawing values between ∗ and  do not
oﬀshore whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing so would increase their productivity.
These adverse eﬀects imply 
e  
e  and, therefore,    so that with oﬀshoring output is always

higher under complete than incomplete contracts.
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Diﬀerently, when it comes to comparing oﬀshoring under contractual incompleteness and no
oﬀshoring only the first adverse eﬀect is relevant as firms with productivity levels between ∗ and
 do not oﬀshore in either case. The ranking in terms of output is therefore ambiguous. In
particular, we have 
e  
e  if and only if
Z

0




Z
³
´
−1
−1

e − 
() 

∗



³
´
e −1
−1 − 
()


that is if the cumulated productivity gain of oﬀshores that are less productive under inshoring
(0    
e  ) is larger than the cumulated productivity loss for oﬀshorers that are more productive
under inshoring (e
    ∗ ).

These results allow us to state the following:
Proposition 5 Making oﬀshoring possible under contractual incompleteness generates static welfare
gains if the cumulated productivity gains of oﬀshores that would be less productive under inshoring
are larger than the cumulated productivity losses of oﬀshorers that would be more productive under
inshoring.
Whether this is indeed the case or not clearly depends on the way () distributes the productivity draws  between the two intervals (0 
e  ) and (e
  ∗ ). This highlights the crucial role of


heterogeneity. For example, if  is Pareto distributed with () = 1 − ( ) − , then 
e  
e

whenever   ( − 1)[2 + (1 − )( − 1)]. In other words, with incomplete contracts oﬀshoring also

generates static gains when there are a lot of unproductive firms and few productive ones.

5.3

Optimal policy

We are now ready to investigate how incomplete contracts lead to diﬀerent policy implications with
respect to complete contracts when the objective is to implement an eﬃcient outcome maximizing
(1) subject to the aggregate resource constraint without any hold up problem. The eﬃcient outcome
is readily characterized by remembering again that, with complete contracts, at the aggregate level
the model with heterogeneous firms is homomorphic to a model with homogeneous firms in which
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all firms are identical to the average heterogeneous firm. We can, therefore, invoke the results in
Grossman and Helpman (1991) to assert that the eﬃcient steady state is characterized by
 =


− ( − 1)  − ,  =  =  = 


(23)

with quantity consumed  =  .
The comparison between  and  shows that, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), due to the
positive learning externality in R&D, at the market outcome with complete contracts our economy
grows too slowly. In this case, optimal intervention then requires an R&D subsidy that equalizes
 =  to  . Specifically, if we call  the optimal fraction of R&D expenditures paid by the
government, such fraction satisfies
 =

 + 
 +  + 

With incomplete contracts the R&D subsidy alone is not enough due to the underproduction of
the intermediate input and, therefore, of the final output. Optimal intervention here requires the
government to subsidize also oﬀshorers’ upstream production. If we call  the optimal fraction of
oﬀshorers’ upstream production costs paid by the government, then we have
 = 1 − 
Hence, both R&D and production subsidies are needed to implement the first best under incomplete
contracts.
To summarize, we can write:
Proposition 6 With complete contracts welfare is maximized through a subsidy to innovation only.
With incomplete contracts welfare maximization also requires a subsidy to oﬀshored production.

6

Conclusion

We have used an endogenous growth model of North-South oﬀshoring with heterogeneous firms to
study its dynamic and static eﬀects on the economy when contracts are incomplete in the South.
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In so doing, we have modelled oﬀshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm’s production
chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream one.
On the positive side, we have shown that, when contracts are incomplete, the possibility of oﬀshoring may have favorable implications for economic growth. The key parameter regulating the
growth eﬀect of oﬀshoring is the bargaining power of the upstream division through a non-linear
relation. While a larger upstream bargaining weight unambiguously promotes oﬀshoring, it (hence
increased oﬀshoring) only stimulates growth up to a critical level. Under complete contracts, oﬀshoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The reason for this is that under complete contracts,
oﬀshoring evenly augments the profitability of R&D and production, whereas with incomplete contracts the gains in profitability are biased towards R&D.
Whether oﬀshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. For example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed, consumption increases
when there are a lot of unproductive firms and very few productive ones.
On the normative side, we have show that, whereas with complete contracts eﬃciency can be
restored through a subsidy to R&D only, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy to oﬀshored
upstream divisions is needed too.
Contrary to the existing literature, our study uses the industry dynamics of firm organization
to reveal the possibility of adverse long term eﬀects of oﬀshoring for the North. In addition, it
emphasizes the role of firm heterogeneity for the social gains from oﬀshoring. This raises the question whether analyses on the consequences of oﬀshoring based on real wages can fully absorb the
mechanisms through which it influences the economy performance. Our analysis has its limitation
and leaves much work for future research on the issue.

References
[1] Antràs P. (2003) Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118,
1375-1418.

24

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper315

24

Ottaviano and Naghavi: Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry D

[2] Antràs P. and E. Helpman (2004) Global Sourcing, Journal of Political Economy 112:3, 552-580.
[3] Baldwin R. E. (2006) Globalization: The Great Unbundling(s), Working Paper, Economic Council of Finland.
[4] Baldwin R. E. and F. Robert-Nicoud (2008) Trade and Growth with Heterogenous Firms,
Journal of International Economics 74:1, 21-34.
[5] Baldwin R. E. and F. Robert-Nicoud (2007) Oﬀshoring: General Equilibrium Eﬀects on Wages,
Production and Trade, CEPR Working Paper No. 6218.
[6] Barba Navaretti G. and A. Venables (2004) Multinational Firms in the World Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[7] Blinder, A. (2006) Oﬀshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution? Foreign Aﬀairs 85:2, 113-128.
[8] Debande O. (2006) De-industrialization, Volume 11, No. 1, European Investment Bank Papers.
[9] Feenstra R. and G. Hanson (2001) Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey
of Trade and Wages, in Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds., Handbook of International Trade,
Basil Blackwell.
[10] Grossman S. and O. Hart (1986) The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: a Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719.
[11] Grossman G. and E. Helpman (1991) Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge
MA: MIT Press.
[12] Grossman G. and E. Helpman (2002) Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 85—120.
[13] Grossman G. and Helpman (2004) Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of
Production, Journal of International Economics 63, 237—262.
[14] Grossman G., E. Helpman and A. Szeidl (2005) Complementarities between Outsourcing and
Foreign Sourcing, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 95, 19-24.
25

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

25

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 315 [2009]

[15] Grossman G, and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2008) Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Oﬀshoring,
American Economic Review 98, 1978-1997.
[16] Gwartney J. and R. Lawson (2003) Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual Report,
Mimeo, Fraser Institute.
[17] Hart O. and J. Moore (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political
Economy 98, 1119-1158.
[18] Helpman E. (2006) Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms, Journal of Economic Literature
44:3, 589-630.
[19] Hijzen A., T. Inui and Y. Todo (2007) Does Oﬀshoring Pay? Firm-Level Evidence From Japan,
RIETI Discussion Paper No. 07-E-005.
[20] Jones, C. (1995) R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth, Journal of Political Economy 103,
759-784.
[21] Kaufmann D., A. Kray, and M. Mastruzzi (2003) Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators
for 1996-2002, Working Paper No. 3106, World Bank.
[22] Kohler W. (2004) International Outsourcing and Factor Prices with Multistage Production,
Economic Journal 114, 166-185.
[23] Melitz, M. J. (2003) The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity, Econometrica 71, 1695-1725.
[24] Naghavi A. and G.I.P. Ottaviano (2006) Outsourcing, Complementary Innovations and Growth,
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5925.
[25] Naghavi A. and G.I.P. Ottaviano (2008) Outsourcing, Contracts and Innovation Networks, in
S. Brakeman and H. Garretson, Eds., Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational, MIT
press, Cambridge, MA.

26

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper315

26

Ottaviano and Naghavi: Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry D

[26] Naghavi A. and G.I.P. Ottaviano (2009) Oﬀshoring and Product Innovation, Economic Theory
38:3, 517-532.
[27] Nunn, N. (2007) Relation-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 122:2, 569-600.
[28] Ottaviano G.I.P. (2009) Contract Enforcement, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth,
in Helpman E., Marin D. and Verdier T., eds., The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
[29] Rodriguez-Clare A. (2009) Oﬀshoring in a Ricardian World, American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
[30] Segerstrom, Paul. (1998) Endogenous Growth without Scale Eﬀects, American Economic Review 88:5, 1290-1310.
[31] Segerstrom, P. and P. Gustafsson (2009) Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth, Review
of International Economics, forthcoming.
[32] Williamson O. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Free Press,
New York.
[33] Williamson O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New York.
[34] World Bank (2004) Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation, World Bank and Oxford
University Press, Washington, D.C.

7
7.1

Appendix
Stronger contract enforcement in the South increases the relative size
of oﬀshorers

The cutoﬀ ∗ is an increasing function of :
´
³
1
 ( ) (1 + (1 − )( − 1)) −1
−2
∗
=
= (1 − )  (1 + (1 − )( − 1)) −1  0
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Since ∗ is an increasing function of , the average productivity of inshorers 
e  is a decreasing

function of :

e
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is granted by the fundamental theorem of calculus. Moreover, since ∗ is an increasing function of
, the relative size of oﬀshorers with respect to the average producer  e
 is an increasing function
of :
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which is positive since ∗   0.
Hence:
)
 ( e
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7.2
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Properties of the elasticity of oﬀshorers’ market share to the quality
of the contractual environment

Recall the definition
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Then the elasticity of oﬀshorers’ market share  to the quality of the contractual environment 
evaluates to
 ln (∗ )  ln( e
)
 ln 
=
+
 ln 
 ln 
 ln 
with
)
 ln( e
=
 ln 

( − 1)

hR

∞
∗

i
∗
)
∗
−1 () + (1 − ) ( )−1  ln (
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as derived in the previous section. Accordingly
 ln 
 ln 

 ln (∗ )
+ ( − 1) (1 −  )
 ln 
 ln (∗ )  ln ∗
= [1 + ( − 1)(1 − ) ]
+ ( − 1) (1 −  )
 ln ∗  ln 

= [1 + ( − 1)(1 − ) ]

where  ln (∗ ) ln ∗ is the elasticity of the extensive margin, i.e. the percentage change in the
fraction of oﬀshorers when the cutoﬀ changes by one per cent.
Given
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we have
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In the limit, this implies that at  = 0 the elasticity of oﬀshorers’ market share to the quality of the
contractual environment equals
 ln 
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since ∗ = 0 (all firms oﬀshore), whereas at  = 1 it equals
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since ∗ =  . Hence,  ln   ln  is strictly positive and finite at both  = 0 and  = 1.
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